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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4298 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH ARUANNO, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DENNIS CAVANAUGH;  
STEVEN JOHNSON; 
JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-5778) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 30, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 31, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Joseph Aruanno appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We 
will affirm the District Court‟s judgment. 
I. 
 Aruanno, who is civilly confined at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in 
Kearney, New Jersey pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predators Act 
(“SVPA”), filed a pro se complaint against the Honorable Dennis Cavanaugh of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey; Steven Johnson, Assistant 
Superintendent of the STU; and John and Jane Doe Defendants.
1
  He also filed a motion 
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).   
 In his complaint, Aruanno alleged that his civil rights had been violated as a result 
of Judge Cavanaugh‟s conduct and judicial rulings in an unrelated civil case pending in 
the District Court, Alves v. Ferguson, Civil No. 01-0789 (DMC) (filed February 15, 
2001).  Aruanno is one of several consolidated plaintiffs in that case.  Aruanno‟s 
complaint did not allege any facts describing any wrongdoing by Steven Johnson. 
                                              
1
 The District Court characterized Aruanno‟s entire complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action.  Because Judge Cavanaugh is a federal employee, that claim should have been 
construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
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 By order entered November 15, 2011, the District Court granted the IFP motion 
but dismissed the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), concluding that it failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.  This appeal followed. 
 II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District Court‟s sua 
sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary, requiring us to draw 
all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff‟s favor.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  On review, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s 
judgment because no substantial issue is presented on appeal.  See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6. 
 We agree with the District Court that Aruanno‟s claims for damages against Judge 
Cavanaugh are barred by judicial immunity.  See Azubuko v. v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duty has absolute immunity 
from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”).  “A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess 
of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the „clear 
absence of all jurisdiction.‟”  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation 
omitted).  Indeed, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies even to allegations of malice 
or corruption.  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds 
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  Because none of Judge Cavanaugh‟s 
actions at issue in the complaint was taken outside of his judicial capacity, we agree with 
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the District Court that Aruanno‟s claims for damages against Judge Cavanaugh are 
subject to dismissal.  We further agree that Aruanno did not demonstrate any basis for 
granting injunctive relief.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 The District Court also properly dismissed the complaint as to Defendant Johnson.  
Aruanno did not allege that Johnson had any personal involvement in the alleged denial 
of his constitutional rights and we have consistently held that “[a] defendant in a civil 
rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be 
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 Ordinarily, a District Court should not sua sponte dismiss a complaint pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim without providing the plaintiff an 
opportunity to amend his complaint.  As it appears that amendment would be futile, we 
conclude that the District Court did not err in declining to afford Aruanno leave to 
amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 As this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
